Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes:
An Analysis of Panel Data
By GERALD E. AUTEN, HOLGER SIEG, AND CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER* As has often been noted, charitable organizations play an important role in American society, and one of their major sources of revenue is private donations. Given this quantitative importance, the continuing interest in tax reform, and the ready availability of data, it is not surprising that the empirical economics literature contains numerous studies of charitable giving, with special emphasis on the effect of taxes.
The early empirical studies estimated both price and income elasticities based on cross-section data and found that the elasticity of giving with respect to the tax-defined price of giving was greater than one in absolute value.' Recently, however, several studies have challenged these findings.2 In particular, Randolph (1995) concludes that estimates of price and income elasticities based on the analysis of cross-section data sets tend to be systematically biased since they incorrectly ascribe permanent significance to variations in prices that are in fact heavily influenced by transitory fluctuations in income.
His results imply that individuals tend to increase their gifts to take advantage of unusually high transitory tax rates.
An obvious problem encountered in any attempt to separate permanent from transitory income and price effects is that data sets only contain measures for current income and prices, not their transitory and persistent components.
This creates a complicated latent variable problem in estimation. Empirical studies of charitable giving that include permanent income typically attempt to measure it by a weighted average of incomes in two or more years.3 A similar procedure is used for prices. This approach not only presumes that researchers can decompose incomes and prices based on the limited information in the sample, but also that econometricians have for all practical purposes the same information set as individuals in the sample and hence use the same decompositions.
As noted earlier by John F. Muth (1960) and Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1976) , the validity of this procedure depends ultimately on the stochastic properties of income and prices. Using finite-lag averages is highly restrictive and typically leads to misspecification problems. In light of these problems, we pursue a new approach for identifying and estimating transitory and persistent price and income effects. Our approach explicitly models the dynamic process determining prices and incomes. This allows us to decompose the sample variances and covariances into transitory and persistent components. We show that this decomposition of the sample variancecovariance matrix is sufficient to identify and estimate the parameters of interest.4
During the time period studied in this paper, tax reforms in 1981 and 1986 significantly altered the distribution of tax rates. These reforms not only lowered the level of tax rates for most individuals, they also broadened the income tax brackets, reduced the number and range of marginal tax rates, and hence created a more uniform distribution of tax rates. Most empirical studies have typically focused on the changes in the levels of the tax rates and ignored the fact that these tax reforms had equally large effects on the higher moments of the distribution of taxes. In contrast to almost all prior empirical work, the estimation procedure developed in this paper allows us to account for the changes over time in the underlying distributions of tax rates, incomes, and donations. We estimate the model using an unusually rich panel data set of tax returns, with up to 15 years of annual data at the individual level and oversampling of affluent individuals. The empirical findings of this paper suggest that persistent price and income changes have substantially larger impacts on charitable behavior than their transitory counterparts. Furthermore, failure to control for deviations from stationarity results in estimates that are sensitive to the choice of the sampling period. Finally, the empirical findings document a rising variance of incomes and a declining variance of prices.
The trend toward more inequality in income is stronger than the trend toward more uniformity in tax prices, which partially explains a trend towards more inequality in donations. Because giving patterns to charitable organizations differ by income level, this increasing inequality promises to affect the overall distribution of contributions among nonprofit organizations (Auten et al., 2002) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I of the paper presents a dynamic model of charitable giving that serves as a motivation for our empirical analysis. We then provide an intuitive explanation of our estimation approach and discuss in detail how it differs from those used in the previous literature. Section II describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section III presents the estimation results. There is a brief concluding section, Section IV, which summarizes the policy implications of our analysis and discusses future research.
I. Estimating a Dynamic Model of Charitable Donations
A reasonable starting point for analyzing charitable donations is a dynamic model of individual behavior in the presence of income taxation.5 We assume that each individual has preferences defined over current and future levels of consumption, Ct, and charitable donations, Gt. The preferences of an individual are represented by a time-separable (expected) utility function with constant discount factor, 13, of the form:
(1) Eti E Ps iU(Gs, Cs)J where U(Gt, Ct) denotes the within-period ity function which satisfies the standard regularity assumptions and Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t. Each individual faces a sequence of budget constraints which can be expressed as:
(2) C, + Gt + Wt,+ I = (1 + rt)Wt + Yt -T (rt Wt, Yt, Gt) where Wt denotes wealth at the beginning of period t and rt is the interest rate. Taxes Tt(Q) are a function of income from capital rtWt, earnings Yt, and charitable contributions. Individuals maximize expected utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints, which yields two sets of optimality conditions. The first set governs the optimal allocation of resources within periods: specific component of household expenditures and analyzes price effects as well as income effects. Bergstrom et al. (1986) , Steinberg (1987) , James Andreoni (1989) , Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad (1996) , and William T. Harbaugh (1998) . (5) g, = bo + b1pt + b2yt +u + E where Et captures the time-vary-ing error term and u is a time-invariant fixed effect which captures unobserved heterogeneity (state variables).6 To simplify the notation, we suppress the individual-specific index i and also the vector xt, which is typically included in all estimated equations to account for observed heterogeneity among individuals. In the current paper we follow common practice and use the logarithms of incomes, prices, and donations in the empirical analysis. We denote the logarithm of these variables by lowercase letters. Individuals surely differ in generosity for a host of reasons unrelated to income and taxes. However most of these unobserved differences in generosity are likely to be time invariant. We take first differences to control for unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects) in the panel, allowing the equation above to be rewritten as:
(6) Agt = b4Ap, + b2AY1 + AEt.
The parameters of this model can be estimated using least squares or IV estimators which control for potential endogeneity of prices.
One of the main drawbacks of the theoretical model presented above is that it does not distinguish between transitory and persistent components of incomes and prices. As Randolph (1995) and others have argued, estimates of price and income elasticities based on equation (7) and (8) and not the right-hand side. This gives rise to a complicated latent variable problem in estimation. Prior empirical studies that have attempted to distinguish between persistent and transitory effects of any kind on charitable donations share the feature that they avoid this latent variable problem by attempting to decompose observed price and income variables into their unobserved components for each individual in the sample. Given the information available in most data sets, the commonly applied algorithms do not necessarily yield reliable decompositions. This is true not only for studies that use simple averages of income, but also for Randolph (1995) , who approximates permanent income as a function of instruments that include a ten-year average of income. These approaches not only presume that the researcher can decompose income and prices based on the limited information in the sample, but also that he or she has, for all practical purposes, the same information set as the individuals in the sample and hence use the same decompositions. As noted by Muth (1960) and Lucas (1976) , the validity of this procedure depends ultimately on the stochastic properties of incomes and prices. In particular, using finite-lag averages is highly restrictive.
Another problem associated with the commonly used decomposition and imputation techniques is that they yield proxies for permanent income and prices which are often time invariant in the sample. This makes it impossible to control for fixed effects in estimation since the coefficients for permanent income and prices are not identified. In addition, it seems overly restrictive to assume that permanent income does not change in response to large, unex- tion in prices is due to income, which is obtained by setting a,, = 0 = a;. In this limiting case, we cannot identify the coefficients b3 and b4. Identification of the tax price effects hence rests on the fact that changes in tax prices are not perfectly explained by changes in income, a feature common to the literature on charitable giving and income taxation. One of the attractive aspects of our estimation approach is that it produces estimates of at,, and a;, which allows us to evaluate the identifying assumptions for the price effects. Drawing on the specifications for income and price above, equation (9) can be rewritten using equations (10) and (14) 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Table 1 ).
III. Estimation Results
The estimation proceeds in two steps. First, we control for differences in observed heterogeneity among individuals and regress the changes in incomes, prices, and donations (in logarithms) on a number of exogenous characteristics. In the regressions we use dummy variables indicating whether an individual received wage income, is self-employed, retired, married, a household head, or has children as regressors, variables which previous studies have found to affect contributions.
We also control for age by specifying the conditional expectation as cubic in age and use year dummy variables to capture time effects. We pool the observations across time periods and estimate the parameters of the simple regression models using ordinary least squares (OLS). In the second stage of the analysis, we compute the covariance matrix of the residuals of these regressions, which is reported in Table 2 .12
The first section of the table gives correla- Table 2 shows, however, that the data do not exhibit this property. There is a substantial amount of variation in the estimated correlations across time, which suggests that a nonstationary version of our model is more appropriate. The MA(1) framework also implies that all second-and higher-order correlations should be equal to zero. In our sample, we find 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 First of all, they suggest that habit formation is probably not very important in charitable behavior. If habit formation were important, we would expect that higher-order autocorrelations of donations would be significantly different from zero. However, we find little support for that in our sample. Second, it has been argued in the literature that agents' decisions depend on past or future prices. These dependencies, if important, would be captured in the correlations between donations and lagged changes in prices or lagged donations and current prices. We also find little supporting evidence for that hypothesis.
We estimate two different model specifica- When estimating the stationary model (columns I through III), we find that estimates of the price elasticity of giving are sensitive with respect to the sample period. Since we do not believe that the underlying behavioral parameters which characterize the price elasticity of giving changed so much during the time period, we interpret this finding as evidence against stationary models. The main reason for the problems encountered in estimating price and income elasticities is that tax reforms passed during this time period significantly altered the distribution of tax rates. While most empirical 13 This result is quite in line with previous research using similar models in other applications. MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989), and Pischke (1995) 14We also estimated pooled regression models using OLS (fixed effects, random effects). We find that the estimated price elasticity is -0.69 (-0.46, -0.68) TABLE 3-ESTIMATED ELASTICITES   I  II  III  IV  V  VI 1980-1983 1980-1987 1980-1992 1980-1983 1980-1987 1980-1992 Stationary 16 OLS, fixed-, and random-effects estimators also seem to suffer from this problem.
17 Comparable point estimates from this latter group are -0.51 (Randolph, 1995 p. 724) , -0.47 (Barrett et al., 1997 p. 328), and -0.29 and -0.40 (Bakija, 1998 pp. 25-26, 28 our estimates of the persistent component of the variances pick up these changes very well lends strong additional support to our framework. Furthermore, we find that tax prices showed a significantly lower dispersion at the end of the 1980's than at the beginning of the decade. This trend toward more uniformity in tax prices is reflected in both the transitory and the persistent components. This finding is, at least partially, a direct result of tax reforms that broadened the income tax brackets and reduced the number and range of marginal tax rates. The second graph in Figure 1 plots the esti- Since there continues to be serious debate about tax proposals that could permanently change the price of giving, the effect of persistent price changes on charitable giving is therefore of considerable practical importance. Consider, for example, the effect of a flat-tax proposal, that would eliminate the charitable Future research needs to address how changes in expectations of future tax policies that these changes engender affect current individual behavior. Alternatively, individuals may learn from past tax reforms, which helps them anticipate future opportunities for giving at favorable tax rates. These issues are inherently difficult to analyze within the traditional regression-based approach since expectations must be modeled explicitly using an adequate stochastic framework. We believe that techniques similar to the ones used in this paper will be useful in thinking about these topics.
